Violence in Philosophy: Deleuze’s Critique of Kant

By Charlie Barton

First encounters with Kant and his philosophy are somewhat violent. Suddenly, all prior explanations regarding the nature of thought, the relationship between ideas and reality, and the constitution of knowledge become feeble and lacking. Kant’s philosophy is violent in this sense, as all that once felt so certain, so unshakable, loses its authoritative character. It is in this vein that Gilles Deleuze and his philosophy of difference must be mentioned. For Deleuze is the philosopher of violence par excellence, as his work will theorize precisely this transgressive movement which characterizes great philosophy. Beyond this, he is a formidable challenger to Kant with his own transcendental philosophy. The following pages will explore these two elements of Deleuze through an overview of his 1968 treatise, Difference & Repetition.

Deleuze himself was born in 1925 to a conservative, Parisian family. Aside from stretch during the war, he spent his entire life teaching, writing and raising his family in the city. He suffered from lifelong respiratory issues that would eventually led to his death in 1995. The first period of his career was marked by a series of monographs of various philosophers he felt were marginalized by tradition such as Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson and Leibniz. These same figures figured heavily in Difference & Repetition, a turning point in his oeuvre, where he began to produce his own original philosophy. This latter period of his career would include a collaboration with Felix Guattari, a militant psychoanalyst, producing well-known works such as Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. His original work is now associated with the post-structuralist movement alongside figures like Foucault, Derrida and Baudrillard. Like his peers, Deleuze is not studied by most Anglo-American philosophy departments, but he remains influential in a broad range of academic fields extending from literary theory, gender studies, politics and even architecture. This is somewhat ironic, given that he considered himself a philosopher, a “pure metaphysician” as he once said (Villani 130). If anything, his widespread appeal is a testimony to his provocative yet insightful philosophy. 

Difference & Repetition was written as Deleuze’s Doctorat D’Etat, the French equivalent to an American doctoral dissertation. It soon garnered a reputation as a difficult and frustrating work. The book strewn with neologisms, re-definitions and countless esoteric allusions, while the prose tends to be dense and often makes large jumps of logic between sentences and between paragraphs. Deleuze also draws from an immensely broad range of disciplines including calculus, thermodynamics, political economy, psychoanalysis, and linguistics. Later on, he acknowledged the difficult nature of the book, but he added that this was on purpose, as these apparent obfuscations act to force a deeper level of reflection on the part of readers. Others add, that for a metaphysician, all these technical references underpin the metaphysical claims he makes; after all, if these claims are not applicable to particulars, then they cannot be considered metaphysical. Most importantly, Difference & Repetition reveals a philosophical blind spot, a certain set of overlooked assumptions, and in turn provides a rigorous theoretical explanation. The book’s complexity ultimately does not detract from its status as a genuine philosophical contribution. This is evident in its three fundamentally philosophical objectives: 1) critiquing the western philosophical tradition; 2) articulating a metaphysics of difference; 3) reconceptualizing the nature and conditions of thought. 

Aptly named, the book is centered around two fundamental, interlocking concepts—difference and repetition. Naturally, Deleuze does not provide a straightforward definition of either concept, instead opting to characterize them throughout the book, forcing the reader to graft together their meanings. If most philosophers define their key concepts by clearly articulating boundaries and making distinctions, Deleuze defines his concepts by filling them in, defining them piecemeal and avoiding any strict delimitations. This is because difference and repetition, as metaphysical concepts, should apply to everything and rigid definitions would simply undermine their metaphysical statuses. Nonetheless, the two can generally be understood in their colloquial sense. It is instead where they are applied that is crucial. 

Following Kant, metaphysics was no longer concerned with the noumenal world, given that noumena are inherently imperceptible and therefore unknowable. Given this, he refocused the metaphysical inquiry onto entities that are instead perceptible and knowable. He divided these entities between phenomena and the mind which receives, organizes and expresses them. Importantly, he also re-introduces of time into philosophy, now as the basic structure in which these phenomena occur. To Deleuze, this move could have initiated a revolution in philosophy, specifically in terms of a genuine confrontation with difference, but Kant was beholden to the philosophical tradition and did not do so. In this sense, Deleuze completes what Kant left unfinished: he claims that difference is the fundamental principle of all knowable, sensuous reality and that this difference is behind everything and throughout everything, both constitutive and determinative of all. This claim amounts to a complete repudiation of the philosophical tradition which holds identities and essences to be fundamental. His opinion is that this canonical view is inadequate to reality as it is experienced, given that it consistently struggles to account for the various ambiguities, cross-contaminations and blurred liminalities that plague these supposedly definite identities. This is evident in ethics, a field preoccupied with establishing universal moral truths, despite the fact that reality is far too complicated to be reduced into mere propositions of truth and falsity. In fact, Deleuze believes most fields make this same mistake and by articulating a philosophy of difference, thought will be re-founded upon a more approximate metaphysics, one which can account for all the complexities of human existence.

This begs the question: if the universe is defined by difference, then what explains all that remains constant or the same? What explains certain indubitable facts, like the conservation of energy or heliocentricity for example? Deleuze’s answer lies in the notion of repetition, which, in light of Kant’s repositioning of metaphysics, broadly refers to the mind and the act of thought—how its faculties operate, how they relate to each other and what they produce. Akin to difference, repetition is a catch-all term and applies to everything pertaining to the mind. And as a metaphysical concept, it concerns the nature of reality itself and the serial, repetitive movement that characterizes it. Each iteration repeats its antecedent, and through this, continuity is introduced into reality with the continuous repetition of elements ad nauseum. But it is crucial to note that each repeated element is not a one-to-one repetition of its predecessor as each new repetition varies from its antecedent. The persistence of the theory of natural selection, for example, lies in its capacity to repeat without changing fundamentally. To fully understand how this happens, it is necessary to examine the interplay between difference and repetition.

  This relationship can manifest itself in two ways depending on the manner by which difference is repeated. Deleuze calls the first mode ‘representation’ and attributes it to the Western tradition. Here, the repeated element is a particular conceptual configuration to which difference is subordinated.  Difference repeats insofar as it is subsumable to this configuration, meaning that any insubsumable difference is excluded from the process of repetition. For this reason, representation is considered to be an inferior type of repetition, as it suppresses difference in favor of the ‘concept’. This configuration can be thought of as a sort of essentialism, a set of uncritical assumptions that propose 1) that phenomenal reality is wholly subsumable to concepts; 2) that each concept captures the full essence of objects it refers to; 3) that truth is attainable at the convergence of conceptual and phenomenal levels. What is then repeated in thought is a universal formulation, regardless of content, which produces a particular, conservative practice of thought. In true repetition, in comparison, difference plays the determinative role in accordance with the metaphysical importance Deleuze invests in it. What is now repeated is difference without concept, difference in its pure, immanent form. Difference dictates repetition, determining what can and cannot repeat: each iteration repeats because of its conformity to difference. Darwin’s theory endures as an explanatory framework by accounting for difference, in this case, as an everchanging reality where plants, animals and their habitat gradually transform. A representational theory like the Biblical account of evolution persists only because it represses certain biological facts in favor of its own framework. The fundamental problem with this latter account lies in its inability account for the true, differential nature of reality. The primacy of true repetition therefore lies in that fact that it affirms metaphysical difference and allows it to be determinative in the act of thought. 

Deleuze illustrates the implications of this construction through a re-interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return. Unfortunately, no definitive account exists of eternal return, as Nietzsche went mad before he could do so but also because such a definition would have violated his literary sensibilities. Deleuze certainly builds off of what Nietzsche did say about eternal return, but his account is nonetheless interpretational rather than definitive. Both will frame it as a metaphysical, cosmological principle, but Deleuze repurpose it as another way to conceive of the interplay of difference and repetition. The endlessly dynamic cycle of eternal return, he writes, “is said of a world the very ground of which is difference, in which everything rests on disparities, upon differences of differences which reverberate to infinity” (DR 241). Moreover, the element of return is equivalent to repetition, as all that returns does so only because it affirms difference. The only constant in this eternal cycle of becoming is difference and the repetition of that difference; the Negative, the Identical, the Same, the Analogous and the Opposed—all these constructions of representation are destined to perish. Representation is a mere attempt to resist this force and a futile one at that. Eternal return is the law of the universe and of the mind—an inevitability. Like Nietzsche, Deleuze wants his readers to affirm eternal return, to escape from the fetters of representation and partake in the true movement of thought, in the interplay of difference and repetition.  

Interestingly, Deleuze’s critique of Kant can be understood in terms of difference and repetition, the former being a repetition of the latter. There is, in other words, a level of continuity between the two, but Deleuze will significantly revise Kant’s philosophy in accordance with what he believes to be a more accurate view of human thought. He too engages in a transcendental, immanent critique like his predecessor, but one that is now rooted in a philosophy of difference.  The following discussion explains how Deleuze repurposes two Kantian concepts, that of the faculties and of ideas, in order to develop his brand of transcendental philosophy. 

One of Kant’s major contributions was recognizing that thought is not a single function, but rather, a composite of numerous functions, each corresponding to a particular faculty. The formation of knowledge, to give an example, requires the Sensibility, the Imagination, and the Understanding to work together. Kant also proposed that the collaboration of these faculties, towards a single object, is fundamentally harmonious, describing this notion as “the idea of a good nature of the faculties, of a healthy and upright nature which allows them to harmonize with one another and to form harmonious proportions” (KCP 21). Knowledge therefore is not produced in a single coup de main, but though the harmonious collaboration of multiple faculties in view of a common object. This assumption, that the faculties are naturally harmonious, is called ‘common sense’ by Deleuze, and he finds it to be problematic. 

To understand his position on common sense, it is crucial to note that Deleuze does not take an epistemological approach like Kant does. He considers the classical notion of knowledge—as certain, universal and eternal—to be incongruent with reality and with thought itself. His doctrine of the faculties does not impose a teleology onto thought or any kind of expectation that valid thought necessarily results in apodictic propositions. He instead emphasizes the origin of thought in what he calls the ‘encounter’. Deleuze agrees with Kant that thought starts with the Sensibility, but he qualifies this point, differentiating between two kinds of sensations, between those that are explicable and those that are not. The former coincides with thought as Kant articulates it, where the sensation in question is subsumable by the faculties and, more specifically, by the categories of the Understanding. However, Deleuze does not consider this to be actual thought, because if pre-existing conceptual frameworks can readily subsume the sensation, then no original thinking is necessary. Actual thought is instead a response to an encounter, a violent confrontation with difference an inexplicable sensation What ensues is the transcendental exercise of faculties. As the faculties can no longer operate as normal, they must transcend and produce new concepts and categories to replace those rendered inadequate by the encounter. And because faculties exist serially in the Deleuzean framework, one transcendental operation leads to another transcendental operation in the next, as this violence passes through and between each faculty. Viewed another way, this process is a series of repetitions of that initial, differential encounter, with each repetition representing a faculty’s transcendental operation.  There is still a kind of collaboration between faculties here, but in a manner that Deleuze characterizes as a ‘discordant harmony’. It is a collaboration that is by nature violent. To him, the sort of harmony attributed to common sense is simply incompatible with any consideration of the encounter. As Kant articulated it, common sense emphasizes the correspondence between phenomena and a priori categories, which means there is no space for any inexplicable difference nor, as a result, any potential for unrestrained creativity. The doctrine of discordant harmony, on the other hand, starts with difference, and through its repetitions, embodies difference. The result is also difference, a new thought appropriate solely to the unique encounter that precipitated it. That is why Deleuze views true thinking as primarily a creative activity, because the consequence of difference must necessarily be difference as well.

Then, what role do ideas play in this context? For Kant, ideas are formed by the transcendental faculty of reason. Unlike other faculties, reason does not have a constitutive function in thought. Its role is instead regulative: ideas systematize and therefore guide individual acts of the understanding toward a common object such as God, Nature or History (Kant 402). But this function is also problematizing, in that the object of an idea is fundamentally indeterminable, or better yet, inexhaustible. This object is either “an ideal focus which lies beyond the bounds of experience” or at the “common horizon” of all thought (DR 169). In either case, this is an object that is unempirical and incomprehensible, and thus irresolvable. This is the regulative problem that the understanding, and thought more generally, is oriented to and can continuously work towards. Deleuze finds both this transcendental element and this problematizing element to be valuable, but he will make several key changes, accounting for his particular emphasis on the encounter. 

The issue with Kant’s conceptualization of ideas, for Deleuze, is that they have a universal, general character. The problematic of God, for example, is prior to any particular encounter with sensible world, which in effect, imposes a blanket concept on an otherwise unique event. The sensation arises and is resolved in the predetermined context of God, which has the effect of excluding any incompatibilities (for instance, that Earth is not 6000 years old as the Bible says). This, once again, amounts to a suppression of difference. The Deleuzean doctrine instead treats the idea as particular to the encounter which precipitates it. It is on the basis of the differential encounter that reason forms the idea and creates a problem towards which the other faculties coordinate. This move implies a critical change from Kant in regard to the object of thought: Deleuze says that thought is not oriented towards the same, general problems, but instead to transient, fleeting problems posed by an unexpected encounter with reality. He calls this ‘transcendental empiricism, explaining that “empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts…but precisely [when] one… treats the concept as [an] object of an encounter, as a here-and-now…from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, different distributed ‘heres’ and ‘nows’” (xx). Importantly, this is the same encounter which catalyzes the transcendental operation of the faculties. It is in fact the idea itself which provides the harmonious discord between the faculties and regulates their functioning.   

By now, Deleuze’s critical project in Difference & Repetition becomes clear. His argument is that the Western tradition is guilty of uncritically imposing concepts and categories of representation onto thought, thereby distorting the act of thought itself.  It was long supposed that Truth was the sole object of thought; that the faculties of the mind were naturally harmonious; that all phenomena were commensurable with a priori, transcendental categories. He sees these suppositions to be contrary to actual thought, which is the consequence of an inexplicable experience, an encounter with the unknown. Thought is not frictionless nor harmonious, but rather transgressive and violent. That is why a philosophy of difference is a reversal of the philosophic tradition. Now difference dictates the rules of engagement between mind and world, where repetition is no longer of that of identity and concept, but instead of difference. Thought is a game of chance, a roll of the dice, where all prior assumptions and so-called truths are scrutinized, and where truly new ideas are born. As such, Deleuze wants to untether philosophy from its preoccupation with representation; he wants his readers to affirm difference, to partake in eternal return and think according to the unique parameters set by the encounter. 

Therefore, it may be reductive to call Deleuze a philosopher of violence. The kind of violence he describes, of the philosophical sort, is not violence for violence’s sake, but rather for the sake of creating something new and original. This is why Deleuze is more of a philosopher of creation. He shows how the encounter initiates the creative act as a series of repetitions that begins and ends with difference. He wants others to affirm difference in pursuit of creation, that capacity to introduce something new into the world. But this interplay of difference and repetition extends beyond individual creative acts: it also applies to the progression of philosophy and the relations that link individual philosophers together. Like Hegel, Deleuze describes the physics of thought and how ideas evolve across time and space. The history of philosophy can be viewed as a serial progression, with individual philosophers each occupying one space in this grand series. They are all repetitions of their predecessors and on account of the difference they encounter, they each create something new, pushing philosophy forwards. Unlike Hegel, thought does not progress by means of reason. Here, it is instead creation that drives philosophy. But this implies that Deleuze is also just one repetition in this great chain. And just as he did violence to Kant, it is inevitable that Deleuze will be a victim as well. But this is not something to resist. If thought is for the sake of creation, one must acquiesce to violence implicit in it. Accepting eternal return is prerequisite for creation and therefore philosophy.

Works Cited:

Deleuze, Gilles. Difference & Repetition. Columbia University Press, 1994. 

Deleuze, Gilles. Kant's Critical Philosophy. University of Minnesota Press, 1985. 

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press, 1999. 

Villani, Arnaud. La Guêpe Et L'orchidée. ULM, 2020.